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ABSTRACT
In many European countries and in the US, populist right-wing
parties are gaining ground. The political agenda of these parties is
dominated by their reluctant or even out-right hostile position
against migration and foreigners and a strong emphasis on
nationalist values in combination with an anti-globalisation
economic agenda. In most cases, the social agenda of the radical
right parties and politicians are more ambiguous and less clearly
explicated. These parties rely on working class ‘insiders’ and
therefore may be expected to oppose austerity measures, but at
that same time have ﬁrm opinions about deservingness and
conditionality that may sometimes harm the interests of their
voters. This article sets out to explore the social policy agenda of
radical right parties in six diﬀerent countries: the US, Sweden, the
Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and France. The article uses
content analysis of speeches and party manifestos as its main
method of data analysis.
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The 2017 election of president Trump in the US may be considered as the ﬁnal step in the
mainstreaming of populist radical right parties and politicians in western democracies.
The recent electoral successes of populist parties in countries such as Austria, Switzerland,
Denmark, Belgium, Italy and Germany has intensiﬁed an already lively scholarly debate on
the political preferences of these parties, their politicians and their electorate (see for
instance Afonso, 2015; Mudde, 2007, 2013; Stockemer, 2017). Without doubt, the nation-
alist and anti-immigrationist stands are the most prominent items on the agendas of the
populist parties (see Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, & Bornschier, 2008). However, fol-
lowing the presumed mixed composure of their electorate, the positions of these parties
on social-economic issues are less clear. Afonso (2015, p. 277) even argues that these
parties are ‘keen on blurring their positions in order to appeal to diﬀerent categories of
voters with conﬂicting economic preferences’ (see also Rovny, 2013). In addition, some
other authors have pointed out the seemingly contradictory positions of populist radical
right parties within the socio-economic domain (see Oesch, 2008). This article sets out
to identify the positions of populist radical right parties on social policies in six
diﬀerent countries.
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Focusing on the last decade, we could argue that the social policy agenda in many
western countries has been characterised by three to some extent contradictory trends.
First, a prolongation of austerity measures in and during the aftermath of the Great Reces-
sion, with a variety of measures including increasing the pension age, tightening eligibility
and increasing conditionality (see for instance Taylor-Gooby, 2013). Second, an agenda of
realigning social policies with the new social risks of the post-industrial society (see Bonoli,
2005; Pierson, 2001a). Here, measures include promoting gender equality, allowing access
to social protection for precarious workers and accommodating the inﬂux of migrants.
This calls for modernising the role of government in social policies. Finally, a growing
popularity of the ideas of social investment in many welfare states, with pleas for invest-
ment in human capital, research and development and equal opportunities for children
(see Hemerijck, 2015; Morel, Palier, & Palme, 2012). In contrast with the austerity
agenda, the social investment agenda calls for an increasing role of government in
social policies.
There has been only limited research on the attitudes of these populist radical right
parties towards the welfare state is, and the research that has been done suggests a lack
of coherence both within parties and between parties (Afonso, 2015; Ennser-Jedenastik,
2018; Röth, Afonso, & Spies, 2017). But populist radical right parties are considered
important political players either through their direct participation in government or
through their indirect eﬀects on the position of other parties Bale, 2003; Aichholzer, Krit-
zinger, Wagner, & Zeglovits, 2014; Arzheimer, 2013; Schumacher & Van Kersbergen,
2016). By oﬀering a systematic and comparative analysis of the social agenda of populist
radical right parties, this article contributes to our understanding of the future develop-
ment if the welfare state in an era in which populist radical right parties are directly or
indirectly co-determining the social agenda of their countries.
This article is structured as follows. The next section summarises the available literature
on populist radical right parties (PRRPs) and their social agendas. Then, I provide an update
of the more recent social challenges that may be included in PRRPs’ social agendas. After
outlining the methodology of the analysis, the article presents an overview of the social
policy agendas of populist radical right parties in six countries: France, Sweden,
Germany, the US, Belgium and the Netherlands. This overview is based on a content analy-
sis of party manifestos and selected speeches of the parties and their leaders. The article con-
cludes with a reﬂection on the main ﬁndings both for the development of welfare states in
the era of political fragmentation and for social policy scholarship.
PRRP’s and their social agendas
According to Mudde (2007), populist radical right parties (PRRPs) share three common
characteristics: they are nativists, authoritarian and populist. Nativist refers to the ideology
that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group and that non-
natives are threatening to the homogenous nation state (Mudde, 2007, p. 19). Authoritar-
ianism refers the strong preferences for law and order of radical right parties. With
populist, Mudde refers to the anti-establishment and anti-elite attitudes of radical right
parties. Despite these common characteristics there are also diﬀerences between these
parties, for instance with regards to regional separationist standpoints or the attitudes
towards homosexuality (see Rooduijn, 2015).
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Considering the social preferences of PRRPs, three diﬀerent positions in scholarship
can be distinguished. The ﬁrst position is the classical position. It states that radical
right parties pursue a neo-liberal social agenda. For instance, one of the classic sources
in this ﬁeld of study is Betz (1993). He considered the ‘pronounced neo-liberal pro-
gramme’ as the main characteristic of radical right parties, in addition to their militant
attacks on immigrants (Betz, 1993, p. 417). According to Betz, radical right populist parties
have tended to hold strong anti-statist positions. (…) The resulting programme marks a
revival of radical liberalism. It calls for a reduction of some taxes and the abolition of
others, a drastic curtailing of the role of the state in the economy and large-scale privatisation
of the public sector (idem: 418).
With regard to the welfare state, Betz (1993, p. 421) argues that ‘[r]ather than seeking to
return to the comprehensive corporatist and welfare-state-oriented policies of the past,
they (PRRPs [mf]) embrace social individualisation and fragmentation as a basis for
their political programmes’. In short, we may call this position the neo-liberal position.
The second position may be referred to as the ‘welfare chauvinism’ position. The
concept welfare state chauvinism was coined by Andersen and Bjørklund (1990). Tra-
ditionally, it reﬂects an anti-immigration attitude towards social policy (see for instance
Schumacher & Van Kersbergen, 2016). Brieﬂy put, welfare chauvinism reﬂects the
opinion that social beneﬁts should be restricted to ‘nationals’ (Oesch, 2008, p. 352) or
‘our own’ (Andersen & Bjørklund, 1990, p. 212). From an analysis of the electorate of
PRRPs, Afonso (2015, p. 275) states that the PRRP-electorate
tends to be constituted by social groups who are typically protected by classical social insur-
ance schemes in Bismarckian welfare systems, and who may be afraid to extend these rights
to outsider groups, such as immigrants and women. The “welfare chauvinist” attitude is
probably the most characteristic expression of this (…). As a whole, this electorate can be
expected to defend the welfare status quo.
In this article, I use the term ‘welfare chauvinism’ to refer to an anti-immigration, nativist
perspective on social policies.
A third perspective is what I label the ‘welfare nostalgia’ perspective. This perspective is
inspired by Häusermann, Picot, and Geering (2012), who stretch the meaning of the
concept ‘welfare chauvinism’ to the exclusion from social beneﬁts of a broader group of
outsiders of the labour market: not only migrants, but also women and perhaps even
other non-traditional workers like self-employed and temp workers. The electoral prefer-
ences that are associated with ‘welfare nostalgia’ are not necessarily racist or xenophobic,
but need to be interpreted in a wider perspective of ‘modernisation losers’ (see for instance
Minkenberg, 2003; Rydgren, 2007) and traditional gender roles (see Akkerman, 2015a;
Spiering, Zaslove, Mügge, & De Lange, 2015). Following Bezt (1994), the modernisation
losers can be understood as
those who are unable to cope with the ‘acceleration of economic, social and cultural mod-
ernisation’ and/or are stuck in full or partial unemployment, run the risk of falling into the
new underclass and of becoming ‘superﬂuous and useless’ for society (Rydgren, 2007, p. 248;
quotes from Bezt 1994, p. 32).
Recently, there has been a growing attention for the role of gender in PRRPs. Akkerman
(2015a, p. 56) shows that ‘almost all parties are conservative when they address issues
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related to the family, such as opportunities for women on the labour market, childcare,
abortion or the status of marriage’. Therefore in this article, welfare nostalgia refers to
policy positions that are aimed at securing or reinforcing the social position of the mod-
ernisation losers based on traditional economic and family patterns. This perspective
differs from the welfare chauvinism perspective as its core is not the exclusion of
foreigners, but the restoration of ‘traditional’ labour relations and social rights.
PRPPs and trends in social policies
In the previous section we have identiﬁed three theoretical expectations about the social
policy preferences of PRRPs. But these parties do not develop their social policy positions
in a static vacuum. They are confronted with a dynamic environment in which welfare
states are challenged by numerous economic, demographic, social and cultural develop-
ments. These challenges lead to a widely-felt need to reform these welfare states (see for
instance Pierson, 2001a). In the scholarly literature on welfare state development, three
main routes for reform can be distinguished: austerity, modernisation and social invest-
ment (see for instance Hemerijck, 2013; Taylor-Gooby, 2013; Van Kersbergen, Vis, &
Hemerijck, 2014). As these three types of reform can be identiﬁed in the political pro-
grammes of traditional political parties and in the policy reforms that are implemented
in current welfare states (see Taylor-Gooby, 2013; Van Kersbergen et al., 2014). PRRPs
will need to relate their policy positions to these three trends. In this section I ﬁrst
brieﬂy elaborate on these types of reform, and then relate the theoretical expectations
about PRRP’s social policy positions from the previous section to these reform types.
The ﬁrst type of reform is austerity. As a consequence of the Great Recession, many
countries have been forced to radically cut in their social programmes. The concept of aus-
terity includes two diﬀerent strategies to do so: cost containment and retrenchment. Cost
containment is, not surprisingly, aimed at reducing the costs of social programmes
without reforming them, for example by not adjusting beneﬁt levels to inﬂation rates.
Retrenchment is aimed at cutting costs by reforming social programmes, for instance
through changing the entitlement conditions or limiting duration of the programme
(Van Kersbergen et al., 2014; see also Pierson, 2001b).
A second type of reform stems from the transition from industrial to post-industrial
society (see Pierson, 2001a). In a very inﬂuential article, Bonoli (2005) has argued that
this transition also implies a transition from ‘old’ to ‘new’ social risks. The ‘old’ social
risks are the risks to which the post-World War II welfare state was supposed to be an
answer: the risks of loss on income through unemployment, old age, sickness or becoming
widowed. The new social risks refer to the risks that are the consequences of the recent
developments in the post-industrial societies. Bonoli (2005) identiﬁes ﬁve types of new
social risks: (1) reconciling work and family; (2) single parenthood; (3) having a frail rela-
tive; (4) possessing low or obsolete skills; and (5) insuﬃcient social security coverage. In
response to the transformation of these risks, reforms have been proposed and
implemented in various countries and in various policy domains to contribute to accom-
modate the transformation from old to new social risks (see for instance Jenson, 2008).
A ﬁnal type of social policy reforms in recent years is the so-called social investment
paradigm. According to Hemerijck (2013, 2015) the social investment paradigm is repla-
cing other traditional ideals of the welfare state. The social investment state aims to
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increase social inclusion and minimise the intergenerational cycle of poverty in order to
protect its population from the increasing insecurity (ﬂexibilisation) of the labour
market. Two principles are central in the social investment perspective. The ﬁrst principle
is based on the equality of opportunity, and thereby following the liberal notion of equal-
ity. By creating equal opportunities through investment the intergenerational cycle of
poverty should be broken. Therefore, the social investment paradigm highlights the
importance of education and the prominent position it takes through one’s life. The
second principle rests on the premise that promoting social inclusion by investing in indi-
viduals and thereby expanding the active and civil society is beneﬁciary for the collective
good (Jenson & Saint Martin, 2006). The key element of social investment is that social
policies should ‘prepare’ individuals, families and societies for new risks, rather than
‘repair’ old risks.
Following from our earlier exploration of PRRPs social policy preferences, we may
now predict the positions of PRRPs in relation to these types of reforms. In a welfare
chauvinism perspective, all socio-economic preferences are related to the PRRPs core
issues of nativism, populism and authoritarianism. This implies that there is no
general support or opposition for each of the three types of reforms, but that it
depends primarily from the design of the reforms. As long as reforms safeguard the pos-
ition of deserving groups and or undermine the rights of non-deserving groups, there
may be support for these measures. Deserving citizens in this perspective are native, obe-
dient, common citizens (see Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016). As indicated in the precious
section, the welfare nostalgia perspective as interpreted in this article is less nativist
than the welfare chauvinism perspective. From this perspective, we therefore expect
little support for the reform measures that have been discussed in the section. Protecting
the losers of modernisation implies a return to the golden age of the welfare state in this
perspective, with preferably undoing many of the earlier reforms. And as PRRPs in this
perspective also tend to have a strong preference for traditional family values, social
investment measures that challenge these values will receive little support or even out-
right opposition. Finally, from the neo-liberal perspective we might expect support for
all measures that cut back on the welfare state and all the regulation involved with it.
So if PRRPs’ ideologies indeed depend on the neo-liberal agenda, there will be
support for austerity measures, for modernisation measures that are aimed at deregula-
tion, for instance in the area of dismissal laws and labour conditions regulations. More-
over, from this perspective we can expect very limited support for social investment
measures, as these tend to increase the role of government in the economy. These expec-
tations are tested in the remainder of this article.
Methodology
To explore the social policy agenda of radical right parties and politicians, six diﬀerent
countries were selected: the US, Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and
France. These mix of countries represents the three traditional Esping- Andersen
(1990) welfare regimes and the data in these countries are accessible rather easily. More-
over, in each of these countries, populist radical right parties or politicians have gained a
considerable amount of votes at the recent elections, even though in the case of the US, it is
questionable to what extent Trump can be considered as a populist radical right politician.
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One of the leading scholars in the ﬁeld of populist radical right parties, Mudde, gives a
clear argument for including Trump in this study:
Trumpismo can be seen as a functional equivalent of the European populist radical right, but
it is a very American equivalent. Trump himself doesn’t hold a populist radical right ideology,
but his political campaign clearly caters to populist radical right attitudes, and his supporter
base is almost identical to the core electorate of populist radical right parties in (Western)
Europe (Mudde, 2015).
The article uses content analysis of speeches and party manifestos as its main method of
data analysis.
The parties that are included in this analysis are the Republican Party in the US, the
Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV), Sweden Democrats, Alternatives for Germany
(AfD), the French Front National, and the Flemish Vlaams Belang. For some parties,
speciﬁcally in the Netherlands and the US, the relation between the populist radical
right party and its leader diﬀers from the traditional forms of representation. In the
case of Trump this is obvious; we can hardly call the Republican Party a populist
radical right party, whereas various scholars and commentators agree that Trump can
be considered as a populist radical right politician (see for instance Greven, 2016;
Hogan & Haltinner, 2015; Mudde, 2015). Therefore, we will refer to ‘Trump’ rather
than to the Republican Party in the remainder of this article. In the Netherlands, the
Freedom Party lacks the traditional party structure. Therefore, the personal views of its
leader Geert Wilders determine the party positions.
To perform the analysis, three speeches of the leaders of the parties have been selected
from the period between 2010 and 2017. This time frame has been selected to allow the
inclusion of diﬀerent themes, as speeches within a relative short time frame tend to
revolve around similar themes. As a trade-oﬀ, the economic context between 2010 and
2017 has signiﬁcantly changed but there are no indications that this has aﬀected the
party positions on speciﬁc themes. Whenever possible, speeches were selected that were
given at important occasions and had the intention to highlight the position of the
party and its leader on a number of policy issues. Examples of such occasions are accep-
tance of the nomination for leadership of the presentation of a party manifesto. In
addition, the content analysis also included the most recent party manifesto of the
parties. For Donald Trump, no proper party manifesto was available. As Trump’s speeches
tend to focus on a small set of topics, additional comments have been used that clarify
Trump’s position on a number of items (see on-line appendix for the full details of
speeches, manifestos and additional sources that have been used in the analysis).
In this article, I use a rather open conceptualisation of social policies, based on Mar-
shall’s (1967, p. 7) classical deﬁnition:
(…) the policy of governments with regard to action having a direct impact on the welfare of
the citizens, by providing them with services or income. The central core consists, therefore,
of social insurance, public (or national) assistance, the health and welfare services, housing
policy.
Based on a preliminary scan of the policy domains the prevailed in the speeches and mani-
festos, I focus on the ﬁelds of health care, pensions, unemployment, education and family
policies. The technique that was chosen for the content analysis is semi open coding.
Synthesising the work of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) on the one hand and
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Gilbert and Specht’s (1993) on the other hand, I have distinguished three levels of welfare
state preferences of PRRPs.
The ﬁrst level is the ideological level. This level includes what Sabatier calls the ‘deep
core beliefs’. Deep core beliefs refer to the normative and fundamental assumptions
that span multiple ﬁelds of social policies. These preferences deﬁne who is deserving
and undeserving of social support, what the goals of social policy in general are and
how the current policy system should be assessed from the normative and fundamental
assumptions. This may be compared to Gilbert and Specht’s ‘allocation’ level. For the ideo-
logical level, we are primarily interested in the deﬁnition and redeﬁnition of deservingness
(see Van Oorschot, 2000).
The second level is the programme level. I take this level to include Sabatier’s so-called
policy core level, which reﬂects the normative and empirical assumptions on the level of
speciﬁc policy programmes. This shows some familiarity with Gilbert and Specht’s ‘pro-
vision’ level. The programme level builds upon the work of Van Kersbergen et al.
(2014). These authors make a distinction between compensation strategies, cost contain-
ment strategies, retrenchment strategies and social investment strategies.
The ﬁnal level is what I call the implementation level. Sabatier here uses the term ‘sec-
ondary aspects’ and refers to primarily to the policy tools that are implemented to reach
the policy goals. In my interpretation for this paper, I choose to follow Gilbert and Specht’s
idea of ‘delivery’, and focus on the preferred way of implementing social policy. The
implementation level analyses what the favourite means of administering and implement-
ing social policies are (see Fenger, 2006). Each statement about social policy has been
coded into one of these levels. This leads to the analytical framework that guides the
data analysis as presented in Table 1.
Analysis of social policy preferences of PRRPs
The ideological level
On the ideological level, ‘welfare chauvinism’ seems to be the dominant position for the
populist parties in all six countries, even though there are considerable diﬀerences
between the parties in the ways they approach the position of immigrants. As for the
issue of deservingness, there are three groups that are explicitly mentioned in the speeches
or party manifestos: veterans, elderly, and ‘ordinary citizens’. On various occasions,
Trump has highlighted the deservingness of veterans, for instance at his acceptance
speech of the Republican nomination: ‘We will take care of our great Veterans like they
have never been taken care of before’. Veterans are the only deserving group that
Trump mentioned in the speeches that have been analysed. The elderly are a group
that are highlighted by the Freedom Party in the Netherlands, the Sweden Democrats
and the Front National in France. For instance the Sweden Democrats state: ‘The
elderly in Sweden deserve access to the world’s best care for the elderly’, whereas
Marine le Pen used the phrase of the ‘courageous’ elderly who started working at the
age of 14 and should not suﬀer from poverty in their old age. Finally, both the Party
for Freedom and Flemish Interest explicitly highlight ‘the ordinary citizen’ as a group
that deserves support. To quote Wilders: ‘We choose for “Henk” and “Ingrid”.1 Ordinary
citizens that work hard and are worried’. In similar fashion, Flemish Interest claims to
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stand up for ‘the scared, white man or woman’. Less outspoken, the Sweden Democrats
plea for the necessity of a ‘common identity’ as a prerequisite for solidarity.
On the issue of who is not deserving of support from the welfare states, the parties’
opinions seem to converge even more. There is a wide consensus in all countries except
Sweden that immigrants are not deserving of social support or even are a threat to the
welfare state. The most extreme positions here are taken by the Dutch Freedom Party
and the Flemish Vlaams Belang. To quote Wilders: ‘The welfare state no longer is a
shield for the weak, but a withdrawal counter for lazy immigrants, for “Ali” and
“Fatima”’.2 Or according to the Flemish Interest Party: the welfare state is not intended
‘for “hammock immigrants” that seek a better future here for themselves and their chil-
dren at the expense of the Flemish tax payers’. Trump and AfD do not address the unspe-
ciﬁed group of immigrants but speciﬁcally focus on illegal immigrants (Trump) or asylum
seekers (AfD) and do so in a more moderate voice.
Only three parties explicitly phrase their goals for the future of the welfare state.
Trump’s vision is characterised by the well-known one -liner ‘We will bring back our
jobs’. This is a goal that Trump shares with Marine LePen for France: ‘To relocate our
businesses and therefore our jobs’. Whereas Trump leaves it at that, Le Pen also reﬂects
on wider goals of the welfare state: ‘To create a welfare state that guarantees equal oppor-
tunities for everyone and a favourable economic climate’. The Sweden Democrats are even
more ambitions in their goals: ‘each citizen is guaranteed a high level of physical, economic
and social security’. The parties are much clearer about what’s wrong with the current
welfare state, and all of them except Trump represent a ﬁrm welfare chauvinist position
here: ‘Immigration is what’s wrong with the current welfare state’. For instance, Geert
Wilders states ‘The welfare state, our pride where Dutch people have paid for with con-
viction for decades, that welfare state has become a magnet for fortune-seekers’. In
other, more moderate phrases, most other parties also highlight the threat that immigra-
tion is to the sustainability of the welfare state. For instance AfD states: ‘A country can
have a well-advanced social system. And a country can have open borders. But a
country cannot have a well-advanced social system and open borders’. The only outlier
on this issue is Donald Trump, who claims that poverty as a consequence of loss of
jobs caused by globalisation is the most important problem of the welfare state.
Table 1. Analytical framework.
Level Content Description
Ideological level Deservingness Statements about who deserves support from social policies
Undeservingness
Goals of social policy
Assessment of the current welfare
state
Statements about who explicitly is unworthy of support from
social policies
Statements about the role and goals of social policy
Statements about the state of aﬀairs in current social policies
Programme level Health care
Unemployment
Statements with speciﬁc policy proposals in one of these
policy ﬁelds
Pensions
Social housing
Family Policies
Education policies
Implementation
level
State
Market
Statements about the preferred mode of supplying social
policies
Non-proﬁt sector and / or social
partners
8 M. FENGER
Table 2 provides a brief overview of the positions on all dimensions as far these could be
retrieved from the sample of speeches and manifestos that have been analysed. Even
though we have not been able to assess all dimensions for all parties, it is clear from
this analysis that social policy preferences of the PRRPs in most countries on the ideologi-
cal level can be addressed as ‘welfare chauvinist’. The only exception is Donald Trump. His
focus on bringing back employment to the US also does not ﬁt with the neo-liberal pos-
ition, as it requires a ﬁrm intervention of the state in the economy. Therefore, I use the
term ‘economic chauvinism’ for the Trump social agenda. Within the other countries,
we can distinguish two groups. The Dutch Freedom Party and the Flemish Interest
Party take a rude and hostile position against immigrants, whereas the other parties are
much more moderate in their welfare chauvinist positions.
The programme level
The programme level focuses on ‘our’ parties’ goals, proposals and assessments in speciﬁc
social policy domains. Just like in the previous section, there is no full set of statements for
each party on each domain. However, as we will see, this does not hinder in the systematic
analysis of each parties’ position on the programme level.
In the domain of health care, both AfD and PVV highlight the understaﬃng in hospi-
tals and nursery homes. For Wilders’ PVV, the understaﬃng is a direct consequence of the
policy of the governing coalition. To quote Wilder: ‘In the Netherlands of prime-minister
Rutte, our elderly are starving and dehydrating in loneliness because there are not enough
nurses. In the Netherlands of prime-minister Rutte, health care was demolished’. There-
fore, Wilders claims that he will be ‘happy to get his wallet out’ to invest in additional staﬀ.
AfD seeks the solution in improving payment and consequentially standing of the nursery
profession. The Front National also proposes to invest in health care to increase the
number of hospitals and to modernise the French health care system. For instance,
LePen proposes to ‘support French start-ups to modernise the health system’. Finally, it
has been hard to ignore that the revocation of Obamacare was on the top of Trump’s
agenda. According to Trump, the mandatory character of Obamacare limits competition
and leads to the increase of costs at the individual and national level.
In the area of unemployment protection, Trump is not very outspoken, but seems to
promote deregulation as the most important way out of unemployment. PVV and
Vlaams Belang both take a ﬁrm anti-austerity position. ‘Simply reducing the duration
of unemployment beneﬁts to contain costs is asocial’, according to the latter. Finally,
both AfD and Front National have proposals that can be considered as updating the
beneﬁt system to the demands of the current labour market. In the case of Front National,
this is aimed at self-employed, as they propose to ‘Create a social shield for the self-
employed by oﬀering them the choice to join the general scheme or to retain the speciﬁcity
of their scheme’. AfD want to restore the unjust consequences that ‘diﬀerent occupational
biographies’ have for beneﬁt coverage.
With regard to pension policies, Trump again is the outsider, as he is the only one pro-
posing to – carefully – increase the pension age: ‘Without disadvantaging present retirees
or those nearing retirement, set a more realistic age for eligibility in light of today’s longer
life span’. In contrast, Front National, Vlaams Belang and PVV do not wish to increase the
pension age or, in the case of PVV, even propose to undo the recent increase. In addition,
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Table 2. Party positions on the ideological level.
Trump PVV Sweden Democrats AfD Front National Vlaams Belang
Deserving Veterans Elderly ‘Ordinary’
citizens
Elderly Elderly ‘Ordinary’
citizens
Undeserving Illegal immigrants Immigrants Asylum seekers Migrants Immigrants
Goals of social policy Bring back jobs High level of security Relocate businesses and jobs
Social protection
Assessment of the
current welfare state
Poverty caused by
relocation of work
Magnet for
fortune-seekers
Inherent contradiction between
welfare and multiculturalism
No open borders and an
advance welfare system
Immigration ruins the system
of social protection
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Vlaams Belang and PVV also have proposals to improve the position of retirees. PVV does
so by proposing to increase second pillar pensions to correct for inﬂation, Vlaams Belang
has various tax proposals in order to reach this goal. Vlaams Belang seems to be aware of
the rising life expectance that challenges the sustainability of the pension scheme, but con-
siders ‘increasing the duration of actual careers’, for instance through limiting pre-pen-
sions schemes, as a suﬃcient solution.
On the topic of family policies, AfD and Vlaams Belang focus on improving the
ﬁnancial position of families with children. Vlaams Belang does so by increasing the
child allowance, AfD through tax relief for parents and continuation of unemployment
beneﬁts for unemployed parents. The National Front in France also proposes to extend
child allowances, and, in addition, proposes a pro-natalist policy to increase fertility.
Moreover, the Front National proposes to ‘restore the free distribution of parental leave
between the two parents’. The Sweden Democrats emphasise much more the importance
of good quality childcare:
Central to all forms of childcare is that the child groups should be as small as possible, parents
should be oﬀered a signiﬁcant inﬂuence over the activities, the children’s imagination and
livelihood are best used and that stress and noise levels are reduced to a minimum.
Finally, and somewhat surprisingly, Trump is the ﬁrst Republican president to propose
paid maternity leave, as he stated that his administration wanted ‘to help ensure new
parents have paid family leave’.
Finally, concerning education, almost all parties state to favour high-quality education.
Geert Wilders is the less outspoken here, claiming only that he will not reform the system
of study grants and free travel for students. Trump assesses the current education system
as ‘an education system ﬂush with cash, but which leaves our young and beautiful students
deprived of all knowledge’. The solution is neo-liberalist: ‘We will rescue kids from failing
schools by helping their parents send them to a safe school of their choice’, and ‘in order to
encourage new modes of higher education delivery to enter the market, accreditation
should be decoupled from federal ﬁnancing’. The Sweden Democrats just highlight the
importance of good quality education for equality: ‘The starting point is that all children
regardless of family background, place of residence and parents’ income must have good
prerequisites for success in life’. They share with Trump the idea that free choice of parents
is a way to force school to deliver high quality education. The AfD is very critical of a few
recent innovations in German education policy, including the so-called competence-
oriented learning and the EU-wide harmonisation of university studies in the Bologna
process. To quote: ‘For over decades now, our teachers and students have been tortured
with new educational experiments. The permanent revolution in school and universities
has seriously harmed’ the German education system, according to AfD. For Front
National, the strengthening of the French identity through education is the key point.
This is done through restoring ‘the authority and respect of the teacher and establish
the wearing of a school uniform’, but most and for all, through teaching the command-
ment of ‘our beautiful French language’ and ‘the love for our culture’. Finally, Vlaams
Belang shares with AfD a repulsion of the reform waves in education. Moreover, it
states that ‘the multiculturalist indoctrination in education should immediately
stopped’, taking again a ﬁrm chauvinist position.
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Table 3 provides a brief overview of the positions of each of the parties on the pro-
gramme level. Overall, we could state that Trump again and clearly represents the neo-
liberal position, just as Vlaams Belang and PVV represent a ‘welfare nostalgia’ position,
with – in the case of Vlaams Belang – a slight tendency towards a welfare chauvinist pos-
ition. Despite the lack of data on some elements, the Sweden Democrats are clear in the
social investment position. AfD and Front National are a bit harder to position, but
show a clear tendency towards the modernisation agenda.
The implementation level
The ﬁnal level is the implementation level. Even though this is less idea-driven than the
other levels, we still can observe some diﬀerences in the preferences among the parties.
Two dimensions have been distinguished here: the desired division of tasks between
state, private, non-proﬁt and corporatist actors and the desired division of tasks
between the national, regional and local level.
Starting with the ﬁrst dimension, it will come as no surprise that Trump starts from the
individual responsibility. An example of this is given when he discusses the responsibility
of parents: ‘Parents have a right to direct their children’s education, care, and upbringing.
We support a constitutional amendment to protect that right from interference by states,
the federal government, or international bodies such as the United Nations’. Even though
they are not always explicit about it, the PVV, seems to prefer a strong position of the state,
which is somewhat in contrast with their anti-establishment character. As said, we only
have circumstantial evidence for this. For instance in the case of the PVV, when
Wilders states ‘Occupational pensions should be corrected for inﬂation’, he either
chooses to ignore the fact that decision about the height of the beneﬁt are taken by the
boards of private pension funds, or he advocates state interference in pension governance.
Both the Sweden Democrats and the AfD are proposing to allow private delivery in some
cases. For instance, the Sweden Democrats state: ‘To improve the performance of welfare
services alternative and private operating modes should be allowed’. Classical German is
the proposal to increase the ﬁnancial contribution of employers to long-term care and
health insurance.
In relation to the division of tasks between the national level and the local level, Trump
is clear in continuing to restrict the federal level: ‘We repeat our longstanding opposition
to the imposition of national standards and assessments’. In Sweden, the Sweden Demo-
crats are afraid of unrestricted local autonomy, and therefore plea for national guidelines
in the areas of care and cure: ‘National quality care and care requirements must exist and
may not undershot. The county council, municipality or district may not be decisive for
what quality of care elderly, weak and sick shall receive’. AfD and Front National both
are concerned about the availability of all kinds of social services in rural areas, and
plea for national interference. Finally, Vlaams Belang shares with Trump a preference
for the state – as opposed to the federal – level, but from a nationalistic perspective:
‘Social policy should be based on the mutual solidarity of Flemish people’.
Table 4 shows a brief summary of the positions of the parties on the implementation
level. Even though there are data missing and there are slight diﬀerences between the
countries, we can categorise the countries as follows. Trump pleas for a decentralised,
private mode of implementing welfare services. The other parties seem to favour
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Table 3. Party positions on the programme level.
Trump PVV Sweden Democrats AfD Front National Vlaams Belang
Health care Increase competition and
deregulate insurance
Increase staﬃng and
undo budget cuts
Increase staﬃng through
improving attractiveness
of nursery profession
Invest in modernisation
and increase number of
hospitals
Unemployment
beneﬁts
Deregulate economy Preserve status quo Improve beneﬁts in case of
interrupted career paths
Make beneﬁts accessible
to self-employed
Oppose
retrenchment
Pension policies Increase retirement age Undo increase of
retirement age and
increase pensions
Improve pension coverage
in case of interrupted
career paths
Prevent increase of
retirement age
Improve income of
pensioners
Limit prepensions
Family policies Introduce maternity leave Guarantee the quality of
child care
Tax relief for families Pro-natalist policies
Extend child
allowances
Redistribute parental
leave among fathers
and mothers
Increase and reform
child allowances
Education policies Increase quality of education
through competition, choice
and innovation through market
incentives
No reform of study
grant system
Guarantee the quality of
education as a condition
for equality
Free school choice
increases competition
on the base of quality
Stop and undo educational
experiments to guarantee
educational quality
Strenghten national
identity
Stop reforms in
education
Stop ‘multicultural
indoctrination’
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Table 4. Party positions on the implementation level.
Trump PVV Sweden Democrats AfD Front National Vlaams Belang
Division of tasks between
public, private, non-proﬁt
and corporatist actors
Individual responsibility
and freedom of
interference
A strong
role for
the state
Allow private
delivery
Allow private delivery
Increase contribution of employers
to health insurance and long term
care insurance
Strong role for the state Strong role for the state
Division of tasks between
national, regional and
local level
State level is the
primary level
Strengthen role of
central
government
Concerns about availability of
services in local areas need
attention from central government
attention
Concerns about availability of
services in local areas need
attention from central
government
Regional level (Flanders)
should be the main
organising principle
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centralised, public systems of delivery with the exception of Vlaams Belang that stands for
public, regional delivery.
Conclusions and discussion
In the previous sections, the positions of populist radical right parties on a number of
social policy issues have been discussed in detail. Table 5 summarises these positions
into a limited number of key concepts. The goal of this article was to identify and
explain the similarities and diﬀerences in the social policy agenda of six populist radical
right parties. In response to this goal, the following conclusions may be drawn (Table 5).
On the theoretical level, three conclusion can be drawn. First, from the exploration of
available scholarly work, three distinctive perspectives on PRRPs’ social policy positions
have been identiﬁed: the traditional neo-liberal perspective, the welfare chauvinism per-
spective and the welfare nostalgia perspective. The empirical analysis shows that with
the exception of Trump, the neo-liberal explanation does not have much validity. Even
though it was very prominent in the ﬁrst wave of radical right scholarship, there is
hardly any European populist radical right party that still embraces neo-liberalism. This
also illustrates the very limited relation between Trump and European radical right
leaders, even though some European leaders highlight their association with the Trump
administration and its ideology. From this analysis, the answer to the question whether
or not Trump should be considered as a PRRP-politician tends to be negative. The
second conclusion on the theoretical level relates to the complex relation between
welfare chauvinism and welfare nostalgia. Even though we have a limited number of
cases in our analysis, it is remarkable that the parties with the ﬁercest anti-immigration
perspectives are also the parties that show the least support for the reforms of austerity,
post-industrial modernisation and social investment. There seems to be no welfare nostal-
gia without ﬁerce welfare chauvinism, and opposite. Moreover, the “strong welfare chau-
vinism” position seems to go hand-in-hand with a rejection of the necessity to adjust the
welfare state to new economic, demographic and social realities like an ageing population
or growing single parenthood. A ﬁnal theoretical conclusion is that from this analysis there
seem to be two current modes of populist radical right politics: the PVV/Vlaams Belang
variety with a ﬁerce and hostile position against immigration, where the welfare chauvinist
ideology indeed seems to dominate all other positions. However, there also seems to be a
more pragmatic variety that can be found in Germany, Sweden and even in France. Here,
the positions in relation to immigration are similar to these in other countries, but with
more careful phrasing and – which is remarkable – more acceptance of the needs of
reform in the welfare state. This distinction between the dogmatic and pragmatic
radical right is worth exploring further in other countries and in relation to other issues
and also in relation to other policy issues, for instance global warming.
An interesting and important empirical conclusion relates to the strong belief and trust
in the ability of (central) government to govern society and solve societal problems.
Whereas a lot of scholarly literature on public policy making highlights the limited
capacity of governments and the necessity of co-production or even self-governance,
most of the PRRPs that have been analysed in this article strongly reject these ideas.
Instead of the radical liberalism that traditionally was attributed to populist parties,
from this analysis it appears that all parties show a strong belief in the role of the
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Table 5. Overview of the social policy positions of six populist right-wing parties.
Trump PVV Sweden Democrats AfD Front National Vlaams Belang
Ideological level Economic chauvinism Welfare
chauvinism
Moderate welfare
chauvinism
Moderate welfare
chauvinism
Moderate welfare
chauvinism
Welfare
chauvinism
Programme level Neo-liberalism Welfare nostalgia Social investment Modernisation Modernisation Welfare nostalgia
Implementation
level
Private, regionalised (state-
level)
Public, centralised Public, centralised Public, centralised Public, centralised Public,
regionalised
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central state as the key actor to resolve social issues and to reduce social risks. The initiative
for social policies according to almost all parties should be with central government.
Building upon this, a ﬁnal conclusions considers the diﬀerences between PRRPs,
speciﬁcally on the programme level. On an abstract level, “welfare chauvinism” may
seem like their uniting principle. And indeed, we ﬁnd welfare chauvinism in the heart
of the ideologies of all European populist radical right parties. But if we delve one layer
deeper, there is rather a lot of variation on the programme level. I have classiﬁed the pos-
itions of the Party for Freedom and Vlaams Belang as welfare nostalgia on the programme
level. According to the speeches and the party manifestos that have been analysed, these
parties would like to return to the “golden age” of the welfare state. In contrast, AfD and
Front National tend to embrace the post-industrial modernisation positions. Finally, on
the programme level the Sweden Democrats’ position can be best characterised as social
investment. Treating PRRPs as a single group in practical and scholarly publications
obscures their mutual diﬀerences and – perhaps more importantly – obscures the under-
lying question how this can be explained. As discussed earlier, various authors attribute
the diﬀerent social policy positions of PRRPs to the characteristics of their electorate
(see for instance Oesch, 2008; Rydgren, 2007). However, the variation that can be observed
on the programme level may also have other explanations. I will outline two possible
explanations here.
The ﬁrst explanation may be related to the characteristics of the political landscape in a
country. As several authors have shown, there seems to be a relation between the position
of mainstream parties and PRRPs. This is obvious in the area of immigration and multi-
culturalism, where the position of mainstream liberal parties has become increasingly
strict (Akkerman, 2015b). According to Akkerman this can not only be explained by elec-
toral competition nut also by the real-life policy experiences with immigration and multi-
culturalism. In the domain of social policies, speciﬁcally the strategy of mainstream left
(labour) parties may be of importance for the political position of PRRPs. If labour
parties embrace the need for austerity and reform of the welfare state, there may be elec-
toral opportunities for PRRPs in defending the welfare state. Moreover, also the experi-
ences with earlier policy reforms may aﬀect PRRPs’ positions. For instance, the welfare
nostalgia in the Netherlands and Belgium may be caused by the negative experiences,
speciﬁcally for the electorate of populist radical right parties, with the rather radical
reforms in these countries. On the other hand, the necessity to adapt the French labour
market institutions to the demands of the globalised, post-industrial economy may be
felt by all French political parties, including the Front National. So there seems to be a
relationship between the political landscape and the policy positions of mainstream
parties in a country, the characteristics and reform processes of the welfare state and
the social policy agenda of populist parties which needs to be explored further.
Building upon the previous explanation, a second explanation may be found in the
relationship between individual preferences of voters in diﬀerent welfare regimes and
the position of PRRPs. The relation between individual welfare state preferences and
welfare regimes has been explored by diﬀerent scholars, for instance by Larsen (2008)
and Roosma, Gelissen, and Van Oorschot (2013). The main conclusion seems to be
that voters in diﬀerent welfare regimes have diﬀerent attitudes towards the welfare
state. Consequentially, this may aﬀect the position of populist parties as well. To
explore this relation further, a more in-depth analysis of the formation process of these
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opinions and positions is needed, including a close monitoring of the evolution of these
positions. But one conclusion can be safely drawn from this article. Those who feared
that the growing popularity of populist radical right parties may lead to a dismantling
of the welfare state can be reassured: if anything, the social policy positions of populist
radical right parties seem to be more inclined towards a revival than a dismantling of
the welfare state.
Notes
1. Traditional Dutch middle class names.
2. Names that frequently occur among Moroccan immigrants.
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List of speeches used:
Donald Trump from the Republican Party
- Acceptance republican nomination
21-7-2016, Cleveland Ohio.
Retrieved from: [http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript-donald-trump-
nomination-acceptance-speech-at-rnc-225974]
- Inauguration speech
20-1-2017, Washington Capitol building.
Retrieved from: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-ﬁx/wp/2017/01/20/donald-trumps-
full-inauguration-speech-transcript-annotated/?utm_term = .5ab05bd18e46]
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Geert Wilders from the party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid)
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21-01-2017, Koblenz
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congres-in-koblenz-integrale-nl-vertaling/]
- General Political Considerations 2016 (Algemene Politieke Beschouwingen)
21-9-2016, The Hague
Retrieved from: [https://www.pvv.nl/36-fj-related/geert-wilders/9258-inbreng-geert-wilders-bij-de-
algemene-politieke-beschouwingen-2016.html]
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9-6-2010, The Hague
Retrieved from: [https://www.pvv.nl/index.php/component/content/article/12-spreekteksten/
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Retrieved from: [http://www.ﬁlipdewinter.be/tag/toespraak]
- End of the year speech 2014
5-2-2014, Hove
Retrieved from: [http://www.ﬁlipdewinter.be/category/toespraken]
– End of the year speech 2012
22-1-2012, Antwerp
Retrieved from: [http://www.ﬁlipdewinter.be/tag/toespraak]
Björn Höcke from Alternative for Germany (AfD)
- Demonstration in Erfurt 2015
16-9-2015, Erfurt
Retrieved from: [http://afd-thueringen.de/reden/]
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20-1-2016, Jena
Retrieved from: [http://afd-thueringen.de/reden/]
– Gathering from Young Alternative in Dresden 2017
17-1-2017, Dresden
Retrieved from: [http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/hoecke-rede-im-wortlaut-gemuetszustand-
eines-total-besiegten-volkes/19273518.html].
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Retrieved from: [http://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/las-hela-jimmie-akessons-almedalen-tal]
- Annual party gathering 2014
3-7-2014, Almedalen
Retrieved from: [https://sdkuriren.se/jimmie-akessons-tal-i-almedalen-2014/]
- Annual party gathering 2016
7-7-2016, Almedalen
Retrieved from: [http://www.mynewsdesk.com/se/sverigedemokraterna/pressreleases/talmanus-
jimmie-aakessons-tal-i-almedalen-2016-1470279]
List of manifestos used:
-AfD: Manifesto for the national parliamentary elections 2017
Retrieved from: [http://www.afd-obb-sued.de/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/afd-programm-
bundestagswahl-2017.pdf].
-PVV: Manifesto for the national parliamentary elections 2017–2021
Retrieved from: [https://www.pvv.nl/visie.html]
-National Front: Manifesto for the presidential elections 2017
Retrieved from: [https://www.marine2017.fr/2017/02/04/projet-presidentiel-marine-le-pen/]
-Sweden democrats: Manifesto 2011 (also used in the elections of 2014)
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-Flemish Interest: Manifesto for the national parliamentary elections 2014
Retrieved from: [https://www.vlaamsbelang.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/20140318Program
maVerkiezingen2014.pdf].
-Trump
Republican platform 2016
Retrieved from: [https://www.gop.com/the-2016-republican-party-platform/]
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